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This article explores the changing nature of supervision in a Community Rehabilitation
Company (CRC) following the Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) reforms to probation
services in England and Wales. Based on an ethnographic study of an office within a
privately owned CRC, it argues that TR has entrenched long-term trends towards
‘Taylorised’ probation practice. This is to say that qualitative and quantitative changes
to the complexion of practitioners’ caseloads since TR reflect a decades-long deva-
luation of the probation service and its staff. The decision to allocate most qualified
practitioners to the National Probation Service means that Case Managers (i.e. pro-
bation service officers) now supervise offenders who would historically have been
supervised by Senior Case Managers (i.e. probation officers). This loss of expertise
has been exacerbated by administrative staff redundancies at the office. The result is
an increasingly standardised and fragmented mode of working within the CRC in
which the majority of services are now delivered by the voluntary sector.
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Introduction
Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) fundamentally restructured the delivery of proba-
tion services in England and Wales. Following a sustained rise in the prison pop-
ulation, which was particularly marked under the preceding New Labour
administrations, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition government (2010–
2015) challenged the effectiveness of the probation service (Ministry of Justice
(MoJ), 2010). Refocusing the service through the lens of the market, they argued,
would provide a cost-neutral way to reduce reoffending and arrest the spiralling
costs of justice: ‘By competing [for] the majority of services, and achieving a more
efficient public sector service, we can extend rehabilitation . . .within allocated
budgets’ (MoJ, 2013a: 11). In June 2014, TR split probation into two organisations:
the publicly owned National Probation Service (NPS) now works only with offen-
ders who pose a high risk of harm, while 21 privately led Community Rehabilitation
Companies (CRCs) supervise low-to-medium risk offenders. Private providers are
remunerated via a ‘Payment by Results’ (PbR) mechanism, which attempted to shift
the focus from outputs onto outcomes (National Audit Office (NAO), 2016).
Just four years after TR was implemented, however, the incumbent Conservative
government acknowledged that further restructuring would be necessary ‘to stabi-
lise probation services’ (MoJ, 2018: 3). PbR has been abandoned (NAO, 2019)
and CRCs’ contracts will be terminated early, with the day-to-day management of all
offenders returning to the NPS (MoJ, 2019). The pressures imposed upon staff as a
result of TR were frequently cited as a factor in CRCs’ underperformance (HMI
Probation, 2017, 2019). This article, therefore, explores the changing nature of
probation supervision in a CRC through the lens of ‘Taylorisation’ – that is, the
process by which management assumes control of a labour process, ‘not only in a
formal sense but [also] by the control and dictation of each step of the process,
including its mode of performance’ (Braverman, 1974: 69). The first part surveys
historical developments in probation supervision, with a particular focus on the
managerial practices which have exposed the service to evermore central control in
recent decades. The second part highlights changes to the complexion of practi-
tioners’ caseloads following TR, in which unqualified practitioners now manage
offenders previously supervised by qualified officers. This is not to devalue the work
performed by those without formal qualifications; rather, to emphasise how TR
presents a continuation of a decades-long period in which probation’s knowledge
and modes of working have been diminished and degraded. The third part shows
how probation practice has become increasingly fragmented, with services typi-
cally delivered elsewhere in the voluntary sector. Finally, the article demonstrates
that an administrative mode of working is becoming normalised at the CRC through
analysis of Samuel, a practitioner who joined the probation service in 2016.
Methodology
The research explored how staff working within a CRC had experienced the TR
reforms, with a particular focus on probation culture and practice. Data were
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generated via ethnographic study of ‘Elizabeth Street’, a pseudonym for a privately
owned CRC office which serves all low-to-medium risk offenders in a large city in
England, in which I observed day-to-day life for three to four days per week over a
period of six months (April–October 2018). A CRC was selected for study because
staff ‘migrating’ from the public sector to the private sector have experienced sig-
nificant organisational change (Burke et al., 2017). Informal access was obtained
following contact with a ‘gatekeeper’, a research officer employed by the parent
company that leads Elizabeth Street. The research was then ratified by HM Prison
and Probation Service’s National Research Committee, aided by a letter of support
by the parent company’s board of directors.
Upon consultation with the gatekeeper, I had the chance to meet with potential
informants and to explain the research prior to the fieldwork commencing, in March
2018. The opportunity to present my research, and thus manage impressions
(Wincup, 2017), was beneficial for securing the consent of probation staff. Con-
versely, I sought offenders’ consent to be observed on the day of the observation.
Approaching offenders just before a prospective observation created an ethical
issue due to the power dynamics inherent to a mandatory probation supervision
between a criminal justice official and an involuntary client. The latter may feel that
refusal to comply could violate the terms of their supervision and thereby coerce him
or her into consent. Practically, though, it was difficult to approach offenders to
distribute the information and consent form before the day of their supervision. Not
only would this have required access to offenders’ personal data, such as a home
address, phone number, or an email account (which they might not have), but there
was also no guarantee that the information would be read, understood, signed, and
returned to the researcher. For this reason, my initial plan was to clearly instruct
practitioners on the aims of my research and ask them to relay the information to
offenders.
However, several instances early on in the fieldwork forced a re-evaluation of this
approach. For example, after one offender refused to consent to an observation, his
supervising practitioner, perhaps not wanting to disappoint me, attempted to per-
suade him to let me observe the interview. I thus had to explain that he was not
obliged to consent and decided to remove myself from the situation. On two
occasions, practitioners, perhaps lacking clarity about my research or looking to
begin the meeting as soon as possible, informed the offender that I was a member of
staff who was training. Again, I was compelled to intervene, clarifying for the
offender that I was, in fact, a researcher looking to observe their supervision
meeting. I politely alerted both practitioners as to why informed and open consent is
critical after the interview. Thereafter, I decided that the best course of action would
be to assume full responsibility for informing offenders about my research. I made
clear to practitioners, individually and in a team meeting, that I would like a minute
or so before the supervision meeting begins to explain that my presence was in no
way connected to the supervisory process, and, crucially, how their refusal to
consent to being observed would in no way impact the terms of their supervision.
When accompanying practitioners on home visits, I asked them to check with
offenders via the telephone that my presence was welcome. Only once did an
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offender verbally withdraw consent after the form had been signed; hence, the
observation did not take place.
All Case Managers and Senior Case Managers interviewed were, at some point
in the research, observed in supervision meetings with offenders, although not all of
those observed were selected for interview. Twenty staff from a range of job roles,
whose experience in probation varied from six months to four decades, were
selected for a one-hour semi-structured interview. The sample comprised 10 Case
Managers, five Senior Case Managers, three Supervision Managers, and two
Senior Managers. The presentation of the data reflects the decision by the parent
company that owns the CRC to modify staff job titles: senior probation officers
became Supervision Managers, probation officers became Senior Case Managers,
and probation service officers became Case Managers (although some of titles
have been adjusted to preserve the anonymity of the parent company). The sample
broadly reflected the demography of the office, and of probation in general, in that
70% of interviewees were female (Kirton and Guillaume, 2015). All names pre-
sented below are pseudonyms.
The changing nature of probation supervision
The probation service has progressed through several ‘phases’ in its history
(McWilliams, 1983, 1986, 1987), but the importance practitioners place upon
relationships in the pursuit of offender reform unites different generations of staff
(Mawby and Worrall, 2013). This relational approach originated from the Church
of England Temperance Society (CETS), which began providing volunteers in the
police courts to vouch for offenders convicted of drunkenness and disorderly
behaviour in the 1870s (Vanstone, 2007). The work of these ‘police court mis-
sionaries’ offered a radical departure from the retributive inclinations of the prison;
yet, their interventions were highly selective, ‘saving the souls’ (McWilliams, 1983:
130) only of those worthy of being saved. The Probation of Offenders Act 1907
formally established probation as a public service after several decades of such
irregular provision (Vanstone, 2007). Inscribed within the Act were the words
‘advise, assist and befriend’ (Jarvis, 1972: 16), which gave clarity as to the ser-
vice’s rehabilitative mission and humanitarian ethos. However, the Home Office’s
reluctance to meet the full costs of the nascent service meant that it was reliant upon
volunteers appointed by the Church to work with offenders (Jarvis, 1972). The
dominance of CETS-sponsored police court missionaries over adult courts con-
tributed to issues of ‘dual control’ (McWilliams, 1983: 130), as practitioners’
loyalties were divided between the Home Office and the Church (Jarvis, 1972).
Recognising the flaws in the formative probation service, the Home Office began
to adopt a more interventionist approach (Vanstone, 2007). Major organisational
changes following the passage of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, including the
compulsory recruitment of probation officers to courts, were accompanied by a
sustained increase in the use of probation orders (Jarvis, 1972). There were also
drives from within the service, led by the National Association of Probation Officers,
to adopt a more scientific approach to offender rehabilitation (Jarvis, 1972).
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Gradually, therefore, religious influences over practice were supplanted by a
casework model which drew from social work knowledge (McWilliams, 1985).
This ‘phase of diagnosis’ (McWilliams, 1986: 241) was underpinned by the
introduction of Home Office-funded training in the 1930s, in which officers
embarked upon social science courses while gaining practical experience (Van-
stone, 2007). By 1941, probation was organised ‘on a wholly public basis’ (Jarvis,
1972: 53): it became a service ‘for which people were trained to enter rather than
called to follow’ (McWilliams, 1985: 261).
Establishing a hierarchical structure proved crucial to the post-war development
of the probation service (Morgan, 2007). The Criminal Justice Act 1948 legislated
for probation areas to be overseen by a principal probation officer and the sub-
sequent Probation Rules of 1949 defined the supervisory duties of the senior pro-
bation officer (Jarvis, 1972). Morgan (2007: 91) highlights how probation
assumed new responsibilities for prisoners’ pre-release ‘throughcare’ and post-
release ‘aftercare’; matrimonial conciliation to support magistrates’ courts, culmi-
nating in practitioners ‘acting as welfare officers in divorce proceedings’ by 1957;
and community sentences. The service expanded accordingly: full-time, qualified
probation officers in England and Wales increased from just over 1000 to nearly
5500 between 1951 and 1981, while the total caseload grew from 55,000 to
approximately 157,000 (McWilliams, 1987). Most new recruits were former ser-
vicemen searching for an alternative career (Knight, 2007). Applicants under the
age of 30 were expected to have a social science diploma; those over 30 would
undertake specific training in areas such as casework, law, and criminology
(Vanstone, 2007). By 1971, an accredited social work qualification was required
of all probation officers (Gregory, 2011). In this sense, probation practitioners were
autonomous professionals supported by the state and the service’s hierarchy to
pursue offender rehabilitation through social enquiry (McWilliams, 1986).
However, confidence in the service’s capacity to rehabilitate offenders was
eroded by sustained post-war increases in crime (Garland, 2001). The politicisation
of these concerns from the late 1970s onwards (Downes and Morgan, 2007)
resulted in a period of marked transformation for the probation service, part of a
wider reorganisation of the state along neoliberal lines (Garland, 2001). Political
economic imperatives towards reducing fiscal expenditure in the 1980s meant that
probation was dominated by a managerial emphasis on efficiency and account-
ability, which challenged the inconsistencies inherent to autonomous practice
(Mair, 2016). While individual officers upheld the service’s tradition of helping
offenders by cultivating relationships, probation came to be an ‘organisational
machine . . . in which the individuals which it processed became units in a frame-
work of policy’ (McWilliams, 1987: 105). In the 1990s, however, a populist ‘tough
on crime’ shift monopolised criminal justice policy (Raynor and Vanstone, 2007).
For probation, attempts to reconcile competing aims of the ‘efficient’ provision of
services with the rising caseloads produced by greater ‘punitivism’ resulted in suc-
cessive governments taking an increasingly interventionist approach to the service’s
governance (Morgan, 2007). In this climate, probation practitioners were com-
pelled to reassess their working practices (Phillips, 2011).
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The consequences of increasingly centralised control over the probation service
have been the focus of considerable academic enquiry in recent years (e.g. Gale,
2012; Gregory, 2011; Phillips, 2011). Some scholars have even drawn parallels
between probation practice and the process of ‘Taylorisation’ (Fitzgibbon and Lea,
2014; Gale, 2012). Derived from the work of Frederick Winslow Taylor on the
factories of late 19th-century America, Taylorisation refers to a theory of scientific
management in which knowledge of a particular labour process is methodically
collated by managers and repurposed as formulaic rules that direct action
(Braverman, 1974). Taylorism, according to Braverman (1974), adheres to three
principles. First, the labour process is rendered ‘independent of the craft, tradition,
and the workers’ knowledge’ (Braverman, 1974: 78) by displacing control onto
managers. Second, the labour process is dehumanised via ‘the separation of con-
ception from execution’ (Braverman, 1974: 79). This is to say that managers, rather
than workers, plan how tasks should be performed. Third, management deploys
‘this monopoly over knowledge’ (Braverman, 1974: 82, emphasis in original) to
systematically plan the working day. The end goal, Braverman (1974: 83) argued,
was to ‘sink [the worker] to the level of general and undifferentiated labor power,
adaptable to a large range of simple tasks’.
Taylorisation is an expedient, albeit imperfect, lens through which to explore the
impact of managerialism on probation supervision (Gale, 2012). That face-to-face
probation practice takes place behind the closed doors of interview rooms has
enabled practitioners to retain a measure of discretion (Burke and Collett, 2015).
However, managerialism has gradually devalued the knowledge and autonomy on
which probation was predicated (Gale, 2012). The introduction of targets in the
1980s, for example, meant that performance could be assessed quantitatively
(Phillips, 2011). Similarly, the imposition of National Standards in 1992 sought to
control for discrepancies in service provision through prescriptive guidelines for
practice, challenging the nature of the supervisor–offender relationship (Bailey
et al., 2007). Social work training requirements were abolished in 1996, severing
the links between practice and the subjectivities of social scientific knowledge, as
probation was repurposed according to the logic of risk management (Hardy,
2014). While risk assessment technologies have been welcomed by practitioners
as supplement to, rather than a surrogate for, traditional casework skills (e.g.
Hardy, 2014; Robinson, 2003), their use does not depend on formal qualifications
(Mair, 2016). Fitzgibbon and Lea (2014: 27), therefore, contend that such changes
resemble ‘Taylorisation’: core tasks have been fragmented and standardised so that
they could be performed by cheaper, lower skilled labour.
A significant effect of managerialism on probation has been to transform the
profile of practitioners: where men comprised the majority of the service in the post-
war period, women now account for approximately 70% of staff (Kirton and
Guillaume, 2015). This demographic shift is in spite of the efforts to ‘toughen’
probation supervision (Knight, 2007). There has also been a sustained growth of
(unqualified) probation service officers relative to (qualified) probation officers, with
the former comprising approximately 50% of staff by 2012 (Mair, 2016). Intro-
duced as ‘ancillaries’ in the 1970s to assist probation officers in their role,
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managing generic cases and performing specialist functions like unpaid work, there
was a marked increase in probation service officers to cover the shortfalls when
training for probation officers was revoked in 1996 (Bailey et al., 2007). In contrast
to aspirant probation officers, whose training is regulated by the state, probation
service officer training is much shorter, has less academic rigour, and is subject to
local fluctuations (Gale, 2012). Against the backdrop of rising caseloads, however,
probation service officers’ jurisdiction has gradually expanded to encompass tasks
typically performed by probation officers (Fitzgibbon and Lea, 2014). Rhonda
(Case Manager) outlined the changes to her role since she began as an ancillary in
1979:
In probation, there’s always been a culture of ‘if the cap fits’ for [probation service
officers]: one minute we could do things and the next minute we couldn’t; one minute
we could take on [domestic violence] cases, next minute we couldn’t. That was all
dependent upon . . . how many cases we had coming through. The only difference then
was [probation officers] wrote reports for courts and managed sex offenders, stuff like
that. But then they got us writing reports for court with no wage rise; we were just
getting closer and closer to being a [probation officer]. (emphasis added)
Rhonda’s comment shows that, far from being static, definitions of the roles and
responsibilities of probation service officers are subject to political vagaries. Based
on questionnaires and interviews with practitioners, Bailey et al. (2007) found that,
although probation service officers felt some anxiety over increasing responsibil-
ities, particularly with regard to higher risk offenders, many welcomed the changes.
For the probation officers in Gale’s (2012) study, however, probation service officer
encroachment upon the supervision of low-to-medium risk offenders resulted in less
face-to-face time with their clients and more paperwork – namely, report writing.
This suggests that the boundaries between qualified and unqualified practitioners
have been blurred. Indeed, Fitzgibbon and Lea (2014) argue that long-term trends
towards Taylorisation laid the foundations for the decision to split the service on the
basis of risk of harm.
TR: Who is supervising whom?
TR extended ‘statutory rehabilitation’ (MoJ, 2013a: 6) of 12 months to all offenders
who serve more than one day in custody, which resulted in approximately 45,000
offenders being added to the total caseload (NAO, 2016). Initial proposals put to
prospective providers estimated that CRCs would manage 80% of offenders (NAO,
2016); in actuality, however, this figure is closer to 59% (NAO, 2019). This is, in
part, because fewer low-to-medium risk offenders are being processed through the
criminal justice system, with the NPS absorbing the excess (NAO, 2016). But
reduced business volumes also reflect a lack of sentencer confidence in the CRCs
(House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2019). Indeed, for George
(Senior Case Manager):
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. . . the court feels a long way away. I feel that’s a matter to regret, because all our work
comes from the court and our reputation depends to a large extent on what the people
who make up the court think of the service we provide. What’s true, or what we’re led
to believe, is that there’s a lack of confidence in sentences from the CRC.
This comment is supported by recent research on CRCs’ absence of a right to
audience at court, which highlighted practitioner frustrations with ‘their lack of
insight into current court practice . . .while court staff recognise their own limitations
of understanding CRC practice’ (Woolford and Salami, 2019: 315).
Where, previously, Senior Case Managers would have been expected to write
and deliver presentence reports for the courts, the TR reforms excluded CRC staff
from this sphere of probation practice (Woolford and Salami, 2019):
I was a court officer – that’s how I saw myself . . . I saw that part of the role, and the
assessment for court, as being very significant. We don’t do that anymore; a huge
chunk of the work was taken away when we moved to the CRC. (Fizz, Senior Case
Manager)
Gale (2012) highlighted probation officer frustrations with how report writing
detracted from their opportunities to engage with offenders in a personal capacity,
but Maddie (Senior Case Manager) argued that such work provided variety:
It was such an interesting role and it was so varied: we were doing court reports, we
were going into prisons and doing parole reports, and the nature of our caseloads was
so varied.
Since TR, however, potential gains in terms of opportunities to cultivate relation-
ships with offenders have been lost within the intensification of her workload:
The job is challenging, but it sometimes feels like it’s the same stuff from different
people. I think that’s probably because we don’t have the time to get to know some-
body, what makes them tick; it’s a conveyor belt.
The increase in practitioner workloads is partially derived from CRC caseloads
being lower than anticipated, for which the resultant financial pressures have meant
that many have responded by cutting staff numbers (House of Commons Justice
Committee, 2018). CRCs are not required to publish data on staffing levels; how-
ever, according to HMI Probation (2017: 11–12), ‘staff numbers [in CRCs] have
been pared down in repeated redundancy exercises, with those remaining carrying
exceptional caseloads’. While there have been no cuts to front-line practitioner
numbers at Elizabeth Street, there have been many administrative staff
redundancies:
The impact of admin going is huge. I cannot stress how much we miss our admin and
the impact that’s had on our workload because we’re doing all the admin. (Rhonda,
Case Manager)
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As such, although the CRC’s share of the total caseload is down, extra adminis-
trative responsibilities have contributed to greater workload pressures (see Tid-
marsh, 2019).
In addition to quantitative increases in practitioner workloads at Elizabeth Street,
many have also experienced qualitative changes in the complexion of offenders
under their supervision. When the probation service was split in 2014, most
(qualified) probation officers were assigned to the NPS while the majority of
(unqualified) probation service officers were shifted to the CRCs (Kirton and Guil-
laume, 2015). Accordingly, Elizabeth Street is predominantly staffed by Case
Managers. The parent company’s guidelines state that Case Managers should not
supervise any cases involving serious domestic violence or child protection:
Even though we’re supposed to be low- and medium-risk of harm, some of the cases
managed by the Senior CaseManagers are very risky cases that you wouldn’t give to a
Case Manager – things like child protection, high level domestic violence. (Kate,
Supervision Manager)
This suggests that there should be clear differentiation between the responsibil-
ities of Case Managers and Senior Case Managers; in practice, though, the loss of
expertise has resulted in the former supervising cases that should be managed by
the latter:
The number and type of cases we’re expected to do, for example, as a [probation
service officer], now Case Manager, I would never have held a domestic violence
case, historically. I would say 70% of my cases have got some kind of domestic
violence attached. (Will, Case Manager)
Concurrent with the first principle of Taylorism (Braverman, 1974), then, the
knowledge of qualified practitioners has been located within the NPS. While this
allocation was beyond the purview of the CRC, the result, mirrored nationally, is that
unqualified staff are ‘doing work formerly undertaken by probation officers’ (HMI
Probation, 2019: 74).
Echoing their Case Manager colleagues, Senior Case Managers also argued
that there had been a blurring of the boundaries between job roles since TR:
At one point, they were talking about the [Senior Case Managers] having the high-end
domestic violence cases and holding the child protection cases, but I know lots of Case
Managers who’ve got child protection cases and I’m damn sure some of them will have
domestic violence cases. That demarcation is not clear now. (George, Senior Case
Manager)
This suggests that changes to roles and responsibilities have been greater for
Case Managers, a point supported by Arthur (Senior Case Manager):
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. . . the new Senior Case Manager role, not much changed. I’d say that more changed
with . . . the Case Manager role, and that caused a lot of issues, anxieties . . .because
we were told that everyone was going to do everything.
The instruction that ‘everyone was going to do everything’ points to an increas-
ingly Taylorised mode of practice in which job roles have been standardised
(Braverman, 1974). Where Senior Case Managers have been deskilled through
the removal of their work for the courts, Case Managers are ‘acting up’ in their role:
We’re jacks of all trades, masters of none. The gap between roles has closed. The only
difference is wages. (Jo, Case Manager, emphasis added)
That Case Managers’ terms and conditions have remained the same despite their
additional responsibilities infers a shift towards cheaper labour. Indeed, Charlie, a
Senior Manager, downplayed the significance of qualifications for probation
supervision:
I have never been a fan of interpreting probation skills as linked to formalised quali-
fications. I personally believe that experiences are at the very least as valuable, prob-
ably more valuable in my own view, to be honest.
The probation service officer role has often been a prelude to becoming a qual-
ified probation officer (Bailey et al., 2007). However, initial plans for the Profes-
sional Qualification in Probation (PQIP), the pathway to becoming a probation
officer/Senior Case Manager, required practitioners to hold a university degree
in one of four subjects deemed relevant to probation to be eligible (Kirton and
Guillaume, 2015). For many staff, this inhibited progression:
I can’t apply for the PQIP under the new rules . . . It’s not good to know that you’re
coming into the service at 25, 30, and there’s no room for improvement if you haven’t
got a degree. (Vicky, Case Manager)
These rules have since been relaxed so that everyone, ‘[n]o matter your back-
ground or level of experience’ (HM Prison and Probation Service, n.d.), can apply
for the PQIP. For Trudy, a Case Manager enrolled on the PQIP during the research,
differences between CRC and NPS caseloads impacted her experience of the
training:
. . .our NPS colleagues [have] got, like, 5 cases: even though they’d be very high risk,
they’re sat at their desks doing essays and things like that, but we’ve got to do that at
weekends or after work. They get to shadow probation officers while they learn; we
don’t get any of that because we’ve got a full caseload that still needs managing.
The shortage of Senior Case Managers relative to Case Managers at Elizabeth
Street thereby reflects decisions made by the Coalition government as opposed to
the CRC. For new Case Managers, occupational socialisation at Elizabeth Street is
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no longer shaped by the acquisition of knowledge, but by an ability to adapt to a
caseload with whom they would previously have been ‘unqualified’ to work:
There’s loads of cases [Case Managers are] dealing with that should really be seen by
Senior Case Managers; but unless you know that it should really be dealt with by a
Senior Case Manager, then you just crack on with it. (Rhonda, Case Manager)
The manner in which staff were allocated under TR resonates with Braverman’s
(1974) claim that, as knowledge of a craft diminishes in importance, workers
become an increasingly flexible, undifferentiated mass of labour. This is not to
detract from the skills and experience of Case Managers at Elizabeth Street; rather,
to emphasise that the findings reflect long-term trends towards the Taylorisation of
probation and the flattening of the occupational hierarchy. The quantitative and
qualitative intensification of Case Managers’ individual workloads can thus be
situated on a managerial continuum, part of the Coalition government’s strategy
to ensure that the TR reforms were cost-neutral (MoJ, 2013a).
Probation practice on the ‘production line’
While decisions as to the allocation of staff were taken by the Coalition government,
the new owners were free to decide upon the specifics of job descriptions, including
job titles. Indeed, the parent company decided to remove ‘probation’ from staff job
titles at Elizabeth Street:
[The parent company] wanted a fresh, new approach: it was all new, they wanted new
titles [and] ownership of it. They didn’t want to call people probation officers; they
wanted Senior Case Managers and Case Managers. (Ashley, Senior Manager)
This semantic shift resembles the generic discourse of the ‘offender manager’
under New Labour – which, for Gale (2012), helped to obfuscate the boundaries
between probation officers and probation service officers. The new job titles, there-
fore, communicate to staff changing expectations for their role:
I think the change of name from probation service officer to a Case Manager was done
to sort of emphasise the fact that it is a different role. Essentially, what you’re doing is
the same, but it was to make it very clear to people, I feel, that it is a new role. (Will,
Case Manager)
Increasing workloads have compelled practitioners to reassess their work and,
by extension, the nature of their relationships with offenders. The Coalition govern-
ment envisaged a prominent role for voluntary sector organisations in the provision
of services, with CRCs having ‘responsibility for the day to day management of the
majority of offenders’ (MoJ, 2013a: 10). This emphasis on management was sup-
ported by Matilda, a Senior Case Manager who joined the service after TR was
implemented:
108 Probation Journal 67(2)
I thought I’d have, say, a caseload of 20 and I’d be in the community with them, out
and about, making sure they got to their appointments, meet the family – you know, be
really involved. But I’m not: I’m managing them from behind my computer. I want to be
[involved], but we’re just sat behind a computer. There’s massive pressure. Basically,
I’m a glorified admin officer and signposter.
This highlights how TR has fragmented probation practice at Elizabeth Street,
offering a continuation of New Labour’s ‘offender management model’: offenders
are ‘the object of action’ (Burke and Davies, 2011: 2) as opposed to the subjects of
practice, with work delivered elsewhere in the voluntary sector. Staff at Elizabeth
Street are expected to signpost as a means through which to lighten the weight of
caseloads:
Unless we look outside of the organisation for resources, then we’re not going to be
successful. Case Managers, on the caseloads they’re on, we’re not going to see any
change. (Sarah, Supervision Manager)
And yet, many of the voluntary sector organisations to which CRCs signpost
offenders are financially imperilled (House of Commons Justice Committee,
2018). According to a Clinks (2018: 24) survey of charities involved in the delivery
of services on behalf of probation, 72% of those with CRC funding have had to
subsidise their costs with other forms of income, including their own cash reserves.
Just eight organisations had a ‘payment by results’ aspect worked into their contract,
with the majority being funded through ‘fee for services’ (Clinks, 2018: 32).
The dominance of the output-based ‘fee for service’ over the outcome-based
‘payment results’ element of the PbR mechanism is also apparent among CRCs
(NAO, 2019). Providers can be penalised for a failure to meet their ‘fee for service’
obligations (NAO, 2017):
We’ve always had a focus on performance, even in the Trust days; the difference is,
now, if we don’t meet those targets, then we lose money. (Kate, Supervision Manager)
The NAO (2019) attribute this enforced focus on performance to the hurried
manner in which the TR reforms were implemented. The cancelling of PbR pilots
when Chris Grayling became Justice Secretary, alongside the Coalition govern-
ment’s ‘low risk appetite for failure’ (NAO, 2019: 9) in managing offenders’ risk,
has resulted in the (further) entrenchment of targets. Here, there are similarities with
the second principle of Taylorism: PbR has further separated ‘conception’ from the
‘execution’ of probation practice (Braverman, 1974: 79):
. . .we get bombarded with emails. [Managers will] say: ‘you need to be doing things
this way’ or ‘you need to be recording it this way’; it’s remembering everything,
remembering to hit targets. Then we’re getting more emails, chasing up if you’ve not
done something. (Maddie, Senior Case Manager)
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Supervision Managers, too, are under pressure from the parent company to
ensure that practitioners meet performance targets (see also Tidmarsh, 2019):
I think we are very much focused on performance targets; there’s very much a message
from the top about ‘we must do this; it’s critical’. (Sarah, Supervision Manager)
Efforts to decentralise probation services through TR have thus embedded the
centralising tendencies associated with managerialism. Processes are necessarily
dictated by management rather than the worker (Braverman, 1974). Accordingly,
practitioners argued that practice has been reduced to ‘box ticking’:
It’s all target-driven now; everything is a tick-box exercise. I don’t feel like I know my
service users, which I think is quite sad because that’s not why I came into probation –
to tick boxes, to get things done in a certain amount of time. (Trudy, Case Manager)
That staff lack the time to work with offenders and to establish relationships
contributes to the sense that probation is focused on quantity over quality:
. . .we are being drip-fed the work that we do with our clients, and it’s less about . . . -
what fits in with them and us being told, ‘right, you need to do this piece of work with
the client’, whether that’s an induction or a risk assessment. It’s becoming more like a
production line. (Arthur, Senior Case Manager, emphasis added)
Unlike Taylorism, though, staff felt that this loss of autonomy is not absolute (see
also Hardy, 2014; Robinson, 2003):
I feel like we do have some autonomy here . . .We can work from home if we want to
work from home; we’re in control of our own diaries. (Matilda, Senior Case Manager)
When set against a lack of control over how services are delivered, however, this
reduced scope arguably represents ‘the illusion of making decisions by choosing
among fixed and limited alternatives’ (Braverman, 1974: 27). This bears some
resemblance to the third principle of Taylorism (Braverman, 1974) in that practi-
tioners’ working days are increasingly structured around the CRC’s need to meet the
targets for which it is paid. Elizabeth Street, for Trudy (Case Manager):
. . . feels like a reporting centre: you can just tick that you’ve seen people here and
that’s their compliance. To me, that’s really sad because . . . I don’t feel like I’m giving
the best support to the client.
Accordingly, where ‘members of the “old” probation service were probation
officers first, administrators second’ (McWilliams, 1987: 107), TR has entrenched
a culture in which staff are administrators first and probation (service) officers
second.
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The changing profile of probation practitioners?
As argued above, probation supervision has undergone significant transformation
in recent decades, manifest in the rise of probation service officers relative to pro-
bation officers. The shift towards an increasingly administrative mode of working
raises questions about how new staff understand their role. Samuel, a Case Man-
ager whose employment in probation began in 2016, after TR was implemented,
joined the service because of a desire to work with offenders:
. . . it was that type of work: having a caseload, doing home visits, working with
housing; you know, helping people, stuff like that.
His reasoning conforms to previous research which has shown that practitioners
are motivated to enter the probation service because of the people-oriented nature
of the work (Annison et al., 2008; Mawby and Worrall, 2013). However, the job
has not fully met his expectations:
I’m enjoying it [but] I think, in an ideal world, I thought [the job] would be a bit more
hands on, seeing people more frequently, doing more home visits . . . you’d be going to
housing options and sorting stuff out, but there’s literally not enough time to do that.
Caseload pressures mean that practice, in his view, is primarily concerned with
risk management:
. . . ideally, you’d have a much smaller caseload so that you could pay much more
attention to the guy and do more stuff with them. Sometimes, it does feel like we just do
risk management with them and that’s it . . .because you don’t have the time.
This lack of opportunity to engage with offenders is in large part due to his
administrative responsibilities:
. . . there’s a lot of admin to do. We have to log every appointment, every time you see
them; ideally, every time you speak to another agency you’d log in that. Every email
you get, you should be logging that, but, again, I try, but it’s difficult to find the time.
The Coalition government gave CRCs broad discretion over how new staff were
trained, as long as it was ‘appropriate’ (MoJ, 2013b). However, this freedom has
established yet more distance between the worker and a discernible knowledge
base (Braverman, 1974):
[There was] not as much [training] as I would have hoped, to be honest. When I first
started, you get, I think it’s, like, a fortnight of training where you learn how to use the
computer systems. (Samuel, Case Manager)
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Given the stress on learning to use the information technologies that are crucial to
managing risk and meeting performance targets, Samuel felt ill-prepared for deal-
ing with people:
You’re kind of chucked in, to be honest, at the deep end – like, my second or third day
here, I had somebody showing up and that was, like, ‘what do I do?’
The continued diminution of probation training hints at a business model at the
CRC that is predicated on cheaper and lower qualified staff. Indeed, Samuel’s
concerns over training were echoed by experienced members of staff, who lamen-
ted the increasingly technicised nature of probation training since TR:
Years ago, you used to get training, and I don’t mean the online crap we get here now.
You’re not absorbing the online training . . . There’s no learning style: tick, tick, tick –
you got it wrong again. (Jo, Case Manager)
Samuel also delivers Building Better Relationships (BBR) – an accredited pro-
gramme aimed at serious domestic violence, which is also delivered to offenders
supervised by the NPS. Part of the ‘What Works?’ movement, accredited pro-
grammes emerged in the mid-1990s as a means to target specific offending beha-
viours; indeed, their successes contributed to the reassertion of rehabilitative
legitimacy during a period in which political confidence in probation was low
(Robinson, 2008). However, accredited programmes form part of a fragmentary
(Braverman, 1974) approach to offender management, as services are delivered
by several practitioners (Gale, 2012):
. . . the BBR group that I run, you get high risk guys showing up to that, and sometimes
you can get embroiled in that; and you can find yourself alone, in a room chatting to a
high risk guy and it’s like, hang on a second, I’m not trained to do that. (Samuel, Case
Manager)
That Samuel delivers services to high-risk offenders on behalf of the NPS shows
how the boundaries between qualified and unqualified practitioners are blurred –
not only within the CRC, but also between the public and the private sector. This
demonstrates how the traditional value placed upon training and the supervisor–
offender relationship has been further diminished.
Tellingly, Samuel’s example of a successful supervision involved very little work
that was personally delivered with an offender:
[The offender] was in a state, homeless, about 19, 20 years old. He’d taken a lot of
drugs in his life, very paranoid, agoraphobic, just a real state . . . I got him into . . .a
housing place; massive, a community place down the road where they put guys up and
they do warehouse workshop work. They feed them, they house them, and give them
about £40 a week. I referred for this guy and he’s doing great; he’s completed his
order and he’s been getting really good reviews from them. He said he’s stopped
drinking, taking drugs; he feels better in himself and in a space of, what, 6 or 7 months
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I’ve been seeing this guy, he’s gone from being in a really shitty place to a much better
one . . . it’s brilliant.
Probation is a job in which positive outcomes can be few and far between
(Mawby and Worrall, 2013), and such success should not be trivialised through
a romanticised lens of how probation practice used to be delivered – if it ever was.
Samuel’s experience, however, indicates that the nature of supervision at Elizabeth
Street, if not the motivations of staff, is changing. No longer is work delivered with
offenders; rather, practitioners are required to summarily assess needs and (further)
outsource supervision. This points to a cheaper, ‘Taylorised’ mode of working in
which practice depends not upon relationships, training, or qualifications, but upon
an ability to sift offenders to relevant organisations in the voluntary sector and
accurately record the information for which the CRC is paid.
Conclusions
Since the 1980s, the value of the social work trained, autonomous probation officer
encouraged to pursue offender rehabilitation through relationships has been
adjudged to be obsolete by successive governments. As such, the nature of pro-
bation supervision, along with the profile of practitioners, has undergone marked
transformation. Practice was exposed to standardising mechanisms of target and
National Standards and severed from its social work roots. These trends towards
ever-greater control created the conditions in which the market logic of competition
and profit could be proffered as an alternative delivery model. However, this article
has demonstrated that TR has exacerbated a decades-long period in which pro-
bation supervision has been standardised and fragmented – such that, in the CRCs,
it is predominantly delivered by cheaper, lesser qualified labour. This managerial
continuity is a natural concomitant of the structural constraints in large part imposed
upon CRCs, manifest in lower-than-anticipated business volumes and a PbR
mechanism which prioritises outputs over outcomes. For practitioners at Elizabeth
Street, the financial pressures under which the CRC operates have been intensified
by administrative staff redundancies, which have detracted from their ability to
establish and maintain relationships with offenders. The emphasis on offender
management, extant in the removal of ‘probation’ from job titles, signifies that
practitioners are expected to coordinate, rather than deliver, services. Accordingly,
the shift to an administrative mode of working means practice increasingly resem-
bles a ‘production line’ (Arthur, Senior Case Manager).
The process of Taylorisation (Braverman, 1974) is thus apposite for exploring
changes to probation practice since TR. The loss of qualified staff to the NPS has
blurred the boundaries between the Case Manager and the Senior Case Manager
roles, as the former are responsible for managing offender profiles previously
supervised by the latter. This is not to detract from the skills of Case Managers nor to
devalue their work. Rather, TR can be situated along a managerial continuum in
which the interventionist approaches of successive governments have sought to
render probation practice more efficient by jeopardising, if not entirely eradicating,
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‘the craft, tradition, and the workers’ knowledge’ (Braverman, 1974: 78). The
pressure to signpost to agencies in the voluntary sector both standardises conduct
and fragments probation practice. Newer staff, like Samuel, continue to be moti-
vated by a desire to work with offenders, although they have been socialised into a
service wherein the time and space available for establishing relationships has been
reduced. In this sense, the centralising tendencies of recent decades have, para-
doxically, been intensified by decentralising market logic.
The Conservative government’s decision, in May 2019, to disband CRCs and to
return responsibility for the everyday management of all offenders to 12 NPS
regions (MoJ, 2019) could have important implications for the Taylorising themes
described in this article. Such reorganisation, the government hopes, will restore ‘a
shared identity and culture amongst all staff’ (MoJ, 2019: 28). To this end, the
(re)dispersal of the expertise could aid what Robinson (2018: 322) has called
enculturation – that is, the ‘process by which new members acquire the norms,
values, behaviours and other tools of [a] particular culture’ – as experienced,
qualified staff are able to pass on the skills and knowledge required to practise.
However, each realigned region will have an ‘Innovation Partner’ from whom
unpaid work and accredited programmes must be procured (MoJ, 2019: 4).
Accordingly, the potential remains for a ‘two-tier’ (HMI Probation, 2017: 6) and
fragmented service, if to a lesser extent than under TR. As with TR (MoJ, 2013a),
attempts to reinvigorate the ‘professionalism’ of probation staff are at the heart of
the government’s reforms (MoJ, 2019). Rather than an equivocal commitment to the
market as the primary driver of professional standards (MoJ, 2013a), the govern-
ment is proposing to establish ‘an independent statutory register for probation
professionals’ (MoJ, 2019: 4) which commits staff to ongoing professional training
and development. And yet, HMI Probation (2019: 74) are more cautious, con-
cluding that the scale of redundancies and resignations as a result of TR mean ‘we
can expect a shortage of professional staff for some years yet’.
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